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OSTERGREN V. CUCCINELLI
The desire for privacy "is a mysterious but deep fact about human
personality." In fact, the notion of a right to privacy is so vital that the United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that such a right exists even though it is
not expressly stated in the United States Consitution. However, when the desire
for privacy has the potential to impinge on another citizen's free speech, how is
it balanced against the First Amendment right to free speech? The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently addressed this question.3
Last year, in Ostergren v. Cuccinelli,4 the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia
law prohibiting intentional communication of another person's social security
number to the public was unconstitutional as applied to Betty Ostergren, the
plaintiff below. Ostergren, an informational privacy advocate, criticized
Virginia for making land records containing social security numbers publicly
available.6 After the Virginia General Assembly passed a statute that prohibited
intentional communication of an individual's social security number to the
general public, Ostergren brought a constitutional challenge based on the First
Amendment that eventually led to a Fourth Circuit appeal.
The case began when Ostergren, a Virginia citizen who "advocates for
information privacy across the country" and seeks to shed light on Virginia's
practice of making land records containing unredacted social security numbers
publicly available on the Internet,8 began posting copies of public records
containing social security numbers obtained from government websites. 9
Ostergren's purpose was to pressure public officials for reform and to publicize
her cause. 10 Until spring 2008, Ostergren's actions were perfectly legal because
Virginia Code Section 59.1-443.2(A), which states that "a person shall not ...
[i]ntentionally communicate another individual's social security number to the
general public," included a statutory exception for public records.11 However,
1. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993).
2. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (stating that the right to
privacy is found in the penumbras of specific provisions in the Bill of Rights).
3. Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2010).
4. 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010).
5. Id. at 286-87.
6. Id. at 266.
7. Id.
8. Id. "By July 2008, every county in Virginia had made its land records available on the
Internet through secure remote access." Id. at 267. Virginia has statutorily addressed the concerns
for informational privacy that arise when documents containing social security numbers are placed
online. Id. Specifically, the Virginia General Assembly has "provided that 'clerk[s] may refuse to
accept any instrument submitted for recordation that includes a grantor's, grantee's or trustee's
social security number."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-227 (2010)).
The General Assembly also addressed redaction of existing documents, with most counties having
completed the redaction process by July 2008. Id. at 268.
9. Id. at 268.
10. Id. at 269.
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the Virginia General Assembly amended the statute to remove the public records
exception, and beginning July 1, 2008, the state could have prosecuted Ostergren
for "publicly disseminating Virginia land records containing unredacted [social
security numbers]."12
Before the amendment took effect, Ostergren filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.13 Ostergren contended that
enforcement of the statute would violate her First Amendment rights.14 The
district court agreed with Ostergren and held that the Virginia statute was
unconstitutional as applied to her website as it then existed. The next year,
after further briefing and argument, the court entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the statute "against any iteration of Ostergren's
website, now or in the future, that simply republishes publicly obtainable
documents containing unredacted SSNs of Virginia legislators, Virginia
Executive Officers or Clerks of Court as part as [sic] an effort to reform Virginia
law and practice respecting the publication of SSNs online." 16  Thereafter,
Virginia's attorney general appealed the district court's constitutional
determination, while Ostergren cross-appealed the scope of the district court's
injunctive relief award.17 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered both of the
challenged decisions.18
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit first reviewed the district court's
constitutional ruling.19 The court began by addressing Virginia's argument that
social security numbers are "unprotected speech that may be prohibited
entirely" 20 based on the fact that unredacted social security numbers "facilitate
identity theft and are no essential part of any exposition of ideas." 2 1 Although
the court noted that the Supreme Court has identified a number of unprotected
speech categories,22 it concluded that the First Amendment protected Ostergren's
publication of land records with unredacted social security numbers because the




15. Id at 270 (quoting Ostergren v. McDonnell, No. 3:08cv362, 2008 WL 3895593, at *14
(E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2008)).






21. Id at 271.
22. Id
23. Id at 271-72. The court also based this conclusion on the Supreme Court's recognition
of the value of drawing attention to the contents of public documents. Id. at 272 (quoting Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)).
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The Fourth Circuit then shifted its focus to Virginia's alternative argument24
that "the state interest in preserving citizens' privacy by limiting SSNs' public
disclosure justifies barring Ostergren's speech." 25 The court recognized that the
facts necessitated balancing the right to free speech with the right to privacy.26
In searching for analogous cases where courts weighed these two rights, the
court reviewed Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn27 and its progeny.28 In Cox
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court reasoned that "the interests in privacy fade
when the information involved already appears on the public record." 29 From
this language and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court articulated a
constitutional standard in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.3 0 regarding
whether a truthful publication about a matter of public significance may ever be
punished.31 In Daily Mail, the Court stated that Cox Broadcasting and
subsequent decisions "all suggest that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order."32 Further, nearly a decade later in Florida
Star v. B.JF,33 the Supreme Court utilized the Daily Mail standard and held that
publishing a rape victim's name legally obtained from a police report was
protected speech under the First Amendment.34
After concluding that the Daily Mail standard applied to Ostergren's
constitutional challenge, two issues remained for the Fourth Circuit: "(1)
whether Virginia ha[d] asserted a state interest of the highest order and (2)
whether enforcing Section 59.1-443.2 against Ostergren would be narrowly
tailored to that interest."35 In considering the first issue, the court stated that,
unlike the district court's application of a subjective standard, "objective criteria
[could] be considered when deciding what constitutes a state interest of the
highest order."36 After discussing the serious privacy concerns accompanying
the distribution of social security numbers,37 the court concluded that "Virginia's
asserted interest in protecting individual privacy . . . may certainly [have]
24. Id. at 273.
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id. at 273.
27. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). "In Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme Court ruled that the First
Amendment prohibits a lawsuit against a television station for broadcasting a rape victim's name
when the station learned her identity from a publicly available court record." Ostergren, 615 F.3d
at 273 (citing Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495-97).
28. See Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 273-76.
29. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 494-95.
30. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
31. Id. at 103.
32. Id.
33. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
34. Id. at 533-41.
35. Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 276.
36. Id. at 277.
37. See id. at 278-80.
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constituted 'a state interest of the highest order."' 38 Ultimately, however, the
court did not decide the state interest question because its "holding ... regarding
narrow-tailoring suffice[d] to resolve the constitutional challenge." 39
In determining whether enforcement of the Virginia statute against
Ostergren "would be narrowly tailored to Virginia's asserted interest in
preserving individual privacy," the court noted that under Cox Broadcasting and
Florida Star, "punishing truthful publication of private information will almost
never be narrowly tailored to safeguard privacy when the government itself
released that information to the press."40 However, the court distinguished the
present case from Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star in two ways.41
First, it noted that "privacy does not hinge upon secrecy but instead involves
'the individual's control of information concerning his or her person."' 42
Second, it noted that unlike in Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star, Virginia
"face[d] considerable obstacles in avoiding initial disclosure of sensitive
information" because of the number of documents and the fact that attorneys
filed many of the documents before the state understood the threat of identity
crimes. 43 Based on these distinctions, the court held that "Virginia should have
more latitude to limit disclosure of land records containing unredacted SSNs
than Cox Broadcasting or Florida Star allowed for protecting rape victims'
anonymity." 44 The court concluded, however, that "the First Amendment [did]
not allow Virginia to punish Ostergren for posting its land records online without
redacting SSNs when numerous clerks [were] doing precisely that."45 Thus, the
court held that enforcement of Section 59.1-443.2 was not narrowly tailored to
the state's interest in protecting individual privacy and affirmed the district
court's ruling that the statute violated the First Amendment.
After the court resolved the constitutional considerations, it moved on to
Ostergren's cross-appeal, in which she contended that the permanent injunction
award was too limited.47  Ostergren argued that the injunction should reach
public officials anywhere in the United States because her website included
records of non-Virginia public officials.48 The court held that the district court
38. Id at 280 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id at 281.
42. Id at 283 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)).
43. d at 285.
44. Id
45. Id at 286.
46. Id at 286-87.
47. d at 287.
48. Id The court held that the issue of whether the First Amendment prohibited Virginia
from enforcing Section 59.1-443.2 against Ostergren for publishing non-Virginia public records
containing social security numbers was not ripe as she had not established an evidentiary record, she
had not developed a legal theory, and no underlying dispute existed because the Attorney General
stated that Section 59.1-443.2 did not reach out-of-state public records. Id at 288.
548 [VOL. 62: 545
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss3/8
OSTERGREN V. CUCCINELLI
did not tailor the injunction "to fit the nature and extent of [Virginia's]
constitutional violation"49 because the injunction failed to protect Ostergren in
publishing Virginia land records containing social security numbers of both
private individuals and non-Virginia public officials. 0 Thus, the court reversed
the permanent injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. 1
Judge Davis concurred in the opinion to express his views regarding "the
appropriate test for identifying and assessing in First Amendment cases the
existence of 'a state interest of the highest order."' 52 Judge Davis opined that
"courts must consider and weigh heavily the state's expressed views and its
conduct or they risk denuding First Amendment rights."5  He did not disagree
with the majority entirely, as he stated that objective data may play some role in
determining whether an interest is "of the highest order." 54 He noted, however,
that it should not "supplant a fact-intensive inquiry into the state's view and its
actual conduct in furthering its asserted interest."55
Taking privacy dangers resulting from the dissemination of social security
numbers and coupling them with free speech concerns, this case confronted what
happens when two important rights collide. Although the Fourth Circuit's
analysis of how the First Amendment should trump the right to privacy on this
56set of facts is interesting, courts have faced this issue many times before.
Ostergren itself analyzes cases in which courts dealt with the clash between free
speech and privacy rights.57
However, the importance and relevance of this case comes to light in the
Fourth Circuit's discussion of whether enforcing the Virginia statute against
Ostergren would be narrowly tailored to Virginia's asserted interest in preserving
individual privacy. In that analysis, the court explains that distinctions between
the present case and Cox Broadcasti and Florida Star could possibly change
the court's narrow-tailoring analysis. Thus, although the Virginia statute was
found unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, a future litigant could
49. Id. at 290 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 289 (quoting Ostergren v. McDonnell, 643 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770 (E.D. Va. 2009)).
51. Id. at 290.
52. Id. (Davis, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 291 (quoting id at 277 (majority opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 291.
56. See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830-34 (1978) (holding
that Virginia could not penalize a newspaper for publishing correct information that had been leaked
about confidential proceedings concerning the investigation of a state judge's conduct); Okla.
Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 309-12 (1977) (holding that a trial court could not bar
newspapers from publishing a juvenile offender's name learned during a court proceeding open to
the public).
57. Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 273-76.
58. See id. at 285 ("The factual differences between this case and Cox Broadcasting and
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use the court's language to overcome the "stringent standard regarding narrow-
tailoring."59
In conclusion, Ostergren v. Cuccinelli provides an excellent example of the
analysis required when one pits the recognized right to privacy squarely against
the right to free speech that the First Amendment protects. Not only does the
Fourth Circuit's opinion contain a thorough discussion of the Daily Mail
standard, but it also gives a seemingly downtrodden privacy advocate a new
argument against a historically stringent narrow-tailoring requirement. In this
case, that new argument came up short, and the Fourth Circuit's entire
constitutional determination seemed to turn on the fact that Virginia allowed
public access to the same documents with unredacted social security numbers
that it was trying to prevent Ostergren from posting.60 Thus, should Virginia
ever try to combat the practices of Betty Ostergren in the future, it must heed the
advice given by Judge Davis in his concurrence and not only "talk the talk, but
[also] walk the walk." 61
Joshua A. Bennett
59. Id. at 280.
60. See id. at 286 ("We cannot conclude that prohibiting Ostergren from posting public
records online would be narrowly tailored to protecting individual privacy when Virginia currently
makes those same records available through secure remote access without having redacted SSNs.").
61. Id. at 291 (Davis, J., concurring).
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